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1. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1996, the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
handed down its first legal decision' since it began operations on
January 1, 1995.2 The case, which Brazil and Venezuela brought
against the United States, challenged regulations of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") setting higher Clean
Air Act emissions standards for imported gasoline than are applied
to similar, domestically produced fuels.' The WTO panel ruled
that the EPA regulations violated the prohibition of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") against domestic laws
that discriminate in favor of domestic products against imports.4
Professor of Legal Studies and Management, the Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania.
' See Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Draws Fierce Criticism, WASH. POST, Jan.
19, 1996, at F3; David E. Sanger, World Trade Group Orders U.S. to Alter Clean
Air Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at Dl, D6.
2 "Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should Be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steady growing volume of real
income and effective demand," over 125 states created the WTO on April 15,
1994. GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 IL.M.
1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The first day of WTO operation was
January 1, 1995. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on
China Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at 14.
3 See Bhushan Bahree, WTO Panel Rules Against U.S. in Dispute Over
Gasoline Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All. The Clean Air Act
required U.S. producers to meet standards based on emissions of gasoline they
produced in 1990. See Sanger, supra note 1, at D6. Meanwhile, many foreign
producers, who did not have equivalent records documenting their 1990
production, were forced to comply with the average U.S. standara, which was
a higher standard than some U.S. refiners had to meet. See id.
I See Sanger, supra note 1, at D6. Specifically, the EPA regulations at issue
violated the GATT "National Treatment" provision set forth in Article Il.
The National Treatment provision states:
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Unlike a ruling of a U.S. court in such a sensitive, environ-
mental case, the WTO opinion was not published or released so
that those interested could see and evaluate the panel's legal
reasoning.5 Nor did interested environmental groups, American
gasoline producers, or South American gasoline exporters have an
opportunity to participate in - or even observe - the panel's
proceedings.6 Under WTO procedures, the panel met, heard
arguments, considered briefs from the states involved, and, with
the help of the WTO's legal office, wrote its decision.7 All of
this activity took place behind closed doors.
Assuming the United States loses its appeal of the decision,'
the only avenue by which the United States can avoid compliance
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internaf sale, offering for safe, purchase, transportation,
distribution, or use.
The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. E, 61 Stat. A3, A18, 55
U.N.T.S 187, 206.
5 See Bahree, supra note 3, at All (noting the report was released only to
the countries that were parties to the case and-would not be circulated to other
WTO member states until January 29, 1996).
' For a discussion of the lack of participation by nongovernmental
organizations in the WTO decisionmaking and policymaking processes, see G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis
of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 847 & n.85 (1995)
(describing unsuccessful efforts by the United States during the Uruguay Round
negotiations to "reform the existing closed nature of GATT panel proceed-
ings").
7 See Bahree, supra note 3, at All. The process leading to the delivery of
the WTO panel opinion in the gasoline emissions case closely resembled the
closed opimon process that characterized the GATT dispute resolution mecha-
nism. See Shell, supra note 6, at 849 & n.93 (describing the role of the WTO
Secretariat as assisting panels with the legal, historical, and procedural aspects
of cases).
' The U.S. Trade Representative stated that he will appeal the decision to
the WTO's new supreme court of trade, the WTO Appellate Body. See Steve
Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision On U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, Int'l
Envtl. Reg. (BNA) No. 5, at 195 (March 6, 1996) (stating that the USTR
announce its appeal of the gasoline decision on Feb. 20, 1996). The right to
an appeal of a WTO panel decision is guaranteed by the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act, supra
note 2, Annex 2, art. 17, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1236 [hereinafter
Understanding].
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under WTO rules will be to persuade every GATT signatory
state, including Brazil and Venezuela, to join the United States in
voting to overturn the decision.9 The decision immediately drew
"fierce criticism" from Republican presidential candidates favoring
economic nationalism, 10 public interest groups favoring environ-
mental causes,"i and economists worried that the case might
undermine support for the WTO in the United States"2
The gasoline import standards case illustrates several of the
problems that both Professor Philip Nichols and I foresee in the
new WTO dispute resolution machinery. While Nichols and I
differ over the direction that reforms of the WTO system should
take, we agree that the WTO system, as now structured, is in
danger of collapse from political stresses.13
In his well-crafted article, Professor Nichols articulates his
disagreements with the WTO reforms I had previously proposed
in an article entitled Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization ("Trade Legal-
ism"). 4 In Trade Legalism, I argue that the WTO should open
its dispute resolution system and policymaking bodies to outside
scrutiny and ultimately to formal participation by a variety of
parties, including businesses and nongovernmental organizations
("NGO"s).1
" Unlike the GATT dispute settlement system, a WTO panel or appellate
decision is adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (a group comprised
of representatives from all states that have signed the treaty in dispute) unless
"the winner of the case can be persuaded to vote to overturn its own victory."
Shell, supra note 6, at 849; Understanding, supra note 8, arts. 16-17, 33 I.L.M.
at 1235-36.
10 See Blustein, supra note 1, at F3 (citing conservative candidate Patrick
Buchanan's position that the United States should withdraw from the WTO
and indicating his intention "to make this a major issue in this [1996
Presidential] campaign").
" See id. (noting the opposition voiced by Public Citizen, the public
interest group founded by Ralph Nader).
12 See id. (discussing economists' concerns that the decision could provoke
vehement "protectionist and isolationist sentiment" against continued U.S.
involvement in the WTO).
13 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300-02
(1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Extension of Standing].
14 Shell, supra note 6.
15 See id. at 907-925. Similarly, Steve Charnovitz supports this opening of
the WTO policymaking and dispute resolution processes to NGOs. See Steve
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
1996]
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Nichols strongly disagrees with this idea and counters with his
own set of suggested reforms. For example, Nichols favors
putting nontrade experts on selected WTO dispute resolution
panels as "minority" members so that nontrade values will be
given a voice within this system. 6 Additionally, Nichols wants
WTO dispute resolution panelists to interpret the WTO Charter
to exempt from WTO override any domestic law enacted
"primarily" to codify some nontrade "underlying societal value"
even if such a law impinges "incidentally" on international
trade.
17
This essay summarizes my thesis, defends it, and discusses why
I think Nichols' reforms would turn the clock backward instead
of forward on trade governance. Additionally, this essay explores
the theoretical foundations for Nichols' proposals and demon-
strates how these foundations both ground and unnecessarily limit
his perspectives on trade governance.
2. BACKGROUND: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, AND THE WTO
The occasion for my 1995 article and for this exchange of
views is the creation of the WTO. The WTO legal system
departs radically from its GATT predecessor in at least two
striking respects. First, a member state that lost a case before a
GATT dispute settlement panel could simply block adoption of
the panel decision by the GATT membership and ignore it.18 By
contrast, WTO legal decisions can be overturned only if all states
that have signed the treaty in dispute, including the winner of the
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996). Indeed, Charnovitz has
pointed out that NGO participation in world trade governance has been an
issue since before the founding of the GATT. See Steve Charnovitz & John
Wickham, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Original International
Trade Regime, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 111 (1995).
16 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 328.
17 See id. at 297, 301; Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 658, 709 (1996).
" See Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 17, at 697. Since all
GATT decisionmaking was by "consensus," one party could utilize a "dilatory"
stratey, block the adoption of a panel report, and bring the dispute resolution
machinery to a halt. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 155-
203 (1993) (citing examples of the dilatory strategy).
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case, vote to reverse them.19 In essence, the de facto veto power
has shifted from the states that lose cases to the states that win
them.20
Second, the GATT system did not provide a legal appeals
process for the loser; it was either veto the decision, delay
compliance for as long as possible, or comply. Under the new
WTO procedures, strict time limits for hearings, and compliance
are now an integral part of the process.2" More striking, a new
appeals process has been established in the form of a permanent
"supreme court" for world trade - the WTO Appellate Body.'
The Appellate Body consists of seven appointed members'
who, sitting as three-judge panels, will apply the "customary rules
of interpretation of public international law" in their decisions.2 4
The Appellate Body has jurisdiction to hear appeals from all
WTO dispute resolution panels and make legal rulings on all
treaties supervised by the WTO.2s The creation of the Appellate
Body and the prospect of a growing corpus of carefully crafted
legal opinions that authoritatively interpret the WTO's main trade
treaties gives the WTO an air of formal legalism that was totally
absent from the GATT.26
19 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
20 See Shell, supra note 6, at 849.
2 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 17(5), 33 LL.M. at 1236.
12 See iL art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1236; see also Shell, supra note 6, at 849-50
& nn.93-98 (describing the composition and functions of the WTO Appellate
Body).
2 The first seven members of the Appellate Body have now been named.
They consist of a former U.S. congressman and trade official, a career New
Zealand diplomat, a German authority on international economic law, an
Egyptian economics professor and former World Bank official, a career trade
diplomat from Uruguay, a Supreme Court Justice from the Philippines with a
graduate law degree from Yale who has extensive experience as a trade lawyer
and international arbitrator, and a Japanese international economic law
professor who studied at Tulane Law School as well as Tokyo University. See
international Trade: WTO reaches Accord on Membership to new Appellate Body,
Picks Members, 1995 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES 230 d14, Nov. 30, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Drexec File.
24 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
s See id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The treaties supervised by the WTO
are set forth in Appendix 1 to the Understanding. See id. App. 1., 33 I.L.M.
at 1244.
26 See Georg M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent
Practice in GA7T, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991) (stating
that the WTO dispute resolution process creates "a system governed by the rule
19961
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In Trade Legalism, I attempt to explain these innovations with
reference to free trade and international relations theories. The
problem of international trade governance arises because the
implementation of free trade theory and the related doctrine of
((comparative advantage"V call for levels of cooperation among
nation-states that are difficult to achieve and sustain in the face of
"realist" assumptions about state behavior.28  As I summarize it,
the classic foreign relations theory of "realism:"
views states as the primary actors in world affairs and
treats all states as autonomous, self-interested, and animated
by the single-minded pursuit of power. The interstate
competition for power, in turn, creates a world that is
characterized by anarchy. In such an anarchic world,
international law is "but a collection of evanescent maxims
or a 'repository of legal rationalizations,'" and internation-
al cooperative arrangements have an unstable existence.29
From a realist perspective, international trade is problematic
because it requires states to lower economic and other protective
barriers, subjecting them to possible exploitation by power-seeking
rivals.
30
The structure of the old GATT dispute resolution system
of law"). For a discussion on the shift from pragmatism to legalism in the
GATT/WTO system, seeJared R. Silverman, Comment, Multilateral Resolution
Over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 253-63 (1996).
27 The doctrine of comparative advantage traces its roots to David Ricardo's
insight that nations are materially better off, individually as well as collectively,
if they produce only those goods and services that they are most efficient at
producing and import the rest of what they need. See EDWIN MANSFIELD,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 357-58 (7th ed. 1992)
(Providing examples to differentiate comparative advantage from absolute advan-
tage).
28 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLrICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3-15 (1960) (discussing the six principles
of political realism); Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits Of Cooperation:
A Realist Critique Of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485,
485 (1988) (describing the fundamental tenets of realism and identifying its
major proponents).
29 Shell, supra note 6, at 855 (footnote omitted).
30 See id. at 856-58 (describing the "paradox of Free Trade governance").
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reflected the seeming paradox between the realist notion of self-
interested states and the idea of multilateral state cooperation to
lower trade barriers. The formally nonbinding GATT system
assumed that a state would comply with international trade rules
only when that state deemed it in its immediate self-interest to do
so.31 To avoid the embarrassment of having states openly defy
GATT rulings, the system gave states that lost panel decisions the
de facto power to veto the panel decision. Consequently,
throughout the entire GATT history, the GATT membership
voted only once to approve economic retaliation by one state
against another for violations of GATT treaty obligations?2
With this highly flexible and forgiving legal structure in the
background, the GATT was able to foster - or at least stay out
of the way of - an unprecedented expansion of trade and global
economic integration during the period between 1947 and 1995."3
Against this background, the new WTO structure raises a
serious problem for realist trade governance theory: how are we
to explain and reconcile (1) the switch from formally nonbinding
to formally binding rules and (2) the change from GATT's loosely
structured, arbitration-styled panel process to the current legalistic
system led by the WTO's Appellate Body? My article attempts
to help develop a theory to explain these developments by
positing three trade governance models - the Regime Manage-
ment Model, the Efficient Market Model, and the Trade
Stakeholders Model.34
The Regime Management Model best describes the current,
state-dominated structure of the WTO. The Regime Management
Model derives from "regime theory"35 in the international organi-
31 Conversely, if it was in a state's interest to comply with a GATT
tribunal ruling, compliance would presumably take place regardless of the fact
that the GATT system was formally nonbinding.
"2 See Netherlands, Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 32 (1953); see also Pierre Pescatore,
Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pt. 2, at 8 n.7 (1995) (referring to the
Netherlands Action initiated in response to U.S. restrictions on dairy imports).
" See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 8-9 (1988) (noting the
probability "that diminishing trade barriers were a major contributory force in
the postwar expansion of incomes").
4 See Shell, supra note 6, at 834-38.
s See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 217-19 (1993)
1996]
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zation literature of political science. Regime theory is an iteration
of realism that focuses on the fact that states usually cooperate
rather focusing on the potential that states may not cooperate.36
Like realism, regime theory views the sovereign nation-state as the
primary actor on the world stage and accepts the state as the sole
voice for its people in international relations. Unlike realism,
however, regime theory assumes that states are motivated to
achieve a set of sometimes conflicting goals, such as wealth
enhancement and domestic political control, and not just the
single goal of power enhancement." Regime theory views trade
treaties as "contracts" among sovereign states that help them to
resolve potentially conflicting interests over these diverse goals.39
Binding, rule-oriented trade adjudication can thus be seen as an
enforcement mechanism by which states solve a multiparty
"prisoners' dilemma"4° arising out of their trade contracts.
Viewed as a formal international trade "regime," the new
WTO legal system has the purpose of providing states with a set
of consistent, international legal rules. These rules are intended
to induce states to negotiate trade relations "in the shadow of the
law," rather than purely on the basis of power relationships.41
Under the Regime Management Model, both the potential gains
to be had from increased trade and the losses to be suffered by
states failing to faithfully abide by the trade adjudication system
serve as sufficient inducements to assure compliance with the
WTO, even though international law lacks a centralized police
(defining international regimes as "'principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around-which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area'").
36 See Shell, supra note 6, at 858-66.
17 See id. at 835.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. When parties bargain "in the shadow of the law," they must take
into account not only their relative power positions and interests, but also their
predictions about how tribunals will interpret rules in particular cases. See, e.g.,
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J;, 950, 968-69 1979) (discussing how legal rules
confer "bargaining endowments" upon the two bargaining sides in a divorce
case, allowing them "to negotiate some outcome that makes both parties better
off than they would be if they simply accepted the result a court would im-
pose").
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power.42
Against this quasi-realist explanation for the WTO, I posited
an alternative - the Efficient Market Model. 43  This model
derives from a combination of the foreign relations theory of
"liberalism" and an ideological commitment to neo-classical free
trade doctrines.44 Under liberalism, nations are neither conceived
of as autonomous, self-maximizing actors, nor are they considered
the ultimate actors on the international stage.45 Rather, private
individuals, businesses, and interest groups are the "essential
players in international society who, in seeking to promote their
own interests, influence the national policies of States" in
international relations.46 Because free trade leads to the most
(comparatively) efficient use of national resources, a majority of
domestic economic interests and all transnational business
enterprises are presumed to favor implementing the doctrine of
comparative advantage as an international "rule of law."47 Such
a rule would constrain domestic protectionists and legal rent-
seekers that attempt to sidetrack governments from pursuing
liberal trading policies.48
Multinational corporations in particular gain from reduced
trade barriers because such barriers represent a deadweight loss on
intra firm movement of goods. Trade barriers between nation-
states amount to nothing more than a tax on internal firm
transfers for large business entities whose production and
distribution span regional and global markets. In the United
States, for example, intra firm sales from U.S. corporations to
their foreign affiliates from 1982 through 1993 annually constitut-
42 See Shell, supra note 6, at 835.
41 See id. at 877-893.
44 See id. at 836.
45 See id.
46 Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Improvement of
International Environmental Law and Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 723,737
(1994) (book review) (describing Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley's definition of
liberalism).
4z See Shell, supra note 6, at 836.
41 See Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open Multilateral Trading System, 6 WORLD
ECON. 393, 406 (1983) (stating that "international [free trade] rules represent a
truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned than the
mass of national (economic) legislation").
1996]
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ed a steady 30% of all U.S. exports. Over the same period,
from 32% to 37% of U.S. imports derived from intra firm
purchases, led by growing numbers of purchases by U.S. affiliates
of foreign firms.50
Because the domestic "losers" from international trade tend to
be well-organized, interest groups favoring free trade confront the
problem of how to systematically induce states to submit to the
greatest amount of free trade discipline. Viewed as an Efficient
Market Model institution, the WTO represents a partial triumph
of free trade interests over protectionist states, not a victory for
states seeking to maintain control over trade."1 With its binding
rules and authoritative Appellate Body,52 the WTO legal system
can potentially provide a strict set of international trade rules.
These rules can be used as legal instruments to strike down
government regulation of trade and achieve efficient international
capital and consumer markets. For example, the recent WTO
gasoline import standards decision 3 can be viewed as a legal
triumph of international oil producers over their U.S. counter-
parts and allies in Congress as readily as a strictly political
adjustment in relations between the states of Brazil, Venezuela,
and the United States.
From the perspectives of global capital and consumer markets,
the WTO promises to become the instrument by which benefi-
ciaries of free trade (or their surrogates) can further reduce the
legal transaction costs of global trade. The WTO's voting
requirement that member states achieve complete unanimity to
overturn a WTO legal decision14 is much stricter, in my view,
than is required to provide simple "regime management."5
4' See Not by the Book, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 76 (citing OBIE
WHICHARD & JEFFREY LOWE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AN
OWNERSHIP-BASED DISAGGREGATION OF THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT 1982-
93 (1995)).
50 See id.
51 See Shell, supra note 6, at 836.
52 See Understanding, supra note 8, art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
13 See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
" See Understanding, supra note 8, arts. 16(4), 17(14), 33 I.L.M. at 1235,
1237.
" Until now, even the more radical international voting conventions
required three-fifths, three-fourths, or weighted majority votes to take action
or make amendments to treaty obligations. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining
Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV.
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Indeed, the idea that all signatory states may be bound by a treaty
interpretation that only a single state (plus a dispute resolution
tribunal) supports is without precedent in international law. By
setting such a high political bar to overturning a legal decision,
WTO framers provided states and free trade advocates with
unambiguous, credible "cover" against criticism whenever
compliance with a WTO legal decision promoting trade might run
counter to any competing constituency's interest - whether that
group is a locally protected industry, an international environmen-
tal group, or a labor rights organization.56 With this leverage,
the Efficient Market Model hypothesizes that the internationally-
minded business interests that always monitored trade disputes as
they wound their way through the GATT will soon push the
WTO to grant them something more than "shadow" status.
5 7
Both the Regime Management Model and - to an even greater
extent - the Efficient Market Model point to a WTO that will
exalt trade over other domestic and transnational values and thus,
Nichols and I agree, place enormous domestic political stresses on
the WTO. But in Trade Legalism I suggest a third model, the
Trade Stakeholders Model, as an alternative vision of the interplay
between trade and other social policies.5 8 This model is more
visionary than either of the other two, and I concede in Trade
Legalism that "[s]ubstantial institutional reforms will be needed
... before the Trade Stakeholders Model can be used as a
blueprint for future jurisprudential developments and systemic
reforms within the WTO."59 Nevertheless, I argue that concerns
about the WTO's long-range stability, the distributive fairness of
global wealth allocation, and the procedural justice of WTO
processes all suggest the normative superiority of the Trade
Stakeholders Model over both the Regime Management and the
769, 792-97 (1994) (discussing various examples of nonconsensus voting
conventions as exceptions to the ordinary practice of requiring consensus to
make any change or adopt any new interpretation of a treaty).
56 Shell, supra note 6, at 900.
17 See id. at 902. Nichols confirms that business groups had favored access
to the GATT. See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 307 n.37
(discussing how groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce and
the World Bank had access to GATT policymaking bodies). Nichols makes no
mention of parallel participation in the GATT by environmental, consumer,
or labor rights groups.
58 See Shell, supra note 6, at 907-25.
s See id. at 838.
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Efficient Market models.'
Like the Efficient Market Model, the Trade Stakeholders
Model sees individuals and groups - not states - as the primary
actors in international relations. Unlike the Efficient Market
Model, however, the Trade Stakeholders Model emphasizes
opening dispute resolution and policymaking processes to
environmental, labor, and other groups. As a result, a wide array
of interests can join businesses and nation-states in the important
task of constructing the economic and social norms that will make
global trade a sustainable aspect of a larger transnational soci-
ety.62 In contrast with the Efficient Market Model, which
emphasizes "economic legalism" in the WTO, the Trade
Stakeholders Model embodies a form of "participatory legalism"
that would render the WTO an effective forum for discussing the
trade-offs between trade and nontrade issues. 63
The transformation of the European Union ("EU") from a
cooperative steel and coal arrangement in the 1950s into the wide-
ranging social and economic entity of today provides a useful
analogy.64 Indeed, the EU and the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") embody Trade Stakeholders Model values that might
inspire WTO reforms, especially as continued global economic
integration shapes international institutions and links trade with
other social values.
To summarize my three claims: (1) the Regime Management
Model best describes the present overall structure of the WTO; (2)
the Efficient Market Model helps explain the most striking
innovations in the WTO system, suggesting that globally oriented
businesses will soon pressure states for more direct access to the
WTO machinery in future rounds of WTO reforms; and (3) the
Trade Stakeholders Model articulates an alternative to the Efficient
Market Model as a blueprint for future reforms that is both
normatively superior and more likely to result in long-run trade
governance stability.
60 See id. at 907-08.
61 See id. at 911.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 915.
6 See id. at 917-19.
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3. A RESPONSE TO NICHOLS
Although Nichols characterizes his disagreement with me as
one involving the policy question of standing for NGOs in the
WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the differences between
Nichols' and my views can better be summarized as a difference
in theoretical approach. As an international relations "liberal," I
look toward the day when international institutions become more
transparent to the constituent domestic and transnational actors
that these international entities purport to serve. On the other
hand, I understand Nichols to be a trade "realist" who prefers to
leave trade matters under the control of diplomats and states.
Nichols acknowledges that "expanded standing [for NGOs in the
WTO] may become desirable" at some point in the future, 65 but
he clearly views this development with alarm.66 Because realists
and trade liberals philosophically disagree about the way interna-
tional relations should be conducted, it is no surprise that Nichols
and I disagree about opening up the WTO.
The realist underpinning of Nichols' world view emerges in a
number of ways. First, Nichols locates all "societal values"
squarely within nation-states and nowhere else.67 Transnational
values, such as global environmentalism and human rights, have
no place in his analysis except as these values achieve expression
either through domestic law or national policies of state "champi-
ons" for these concerns." This focus on states as the sole
legitimate voices in international affairs is classically realist.
Second, Nichols sees institutions such as the GATT and the
WTO solely as "forums in which governments, not private
parties, formulate trade policy."69 I agree with Nichols' factual
assertion that governments dominated the GATT structure and
governments created the WTO. But Nichols takes the fact of
government domination a step further - he considers state-
centeredness as "the essence" of the WTO.70  An alternative
65 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 327.
6 See id. (stating that calls for expanding the scope of standing before WTO
dispute settlement panels "are suspect" and "should be heeded with caution").
67 See Nichols, Trade Without Values, supra note 17, at 668-90.
68 See id. at 676.
69 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 303.
70 See id.
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arrangement for governing global trade appears, to Nichols, not
only unwise, but inconceivable because such arrangements are
"based on implicit assumptions that do not comport with the real
world."7 1  The "real world" of which he speaks, however, is
simply the existing system of nation-states in which realists
believe, not some truly objective reality.
In fact, global institutional arrangements show considerably
more complexity and flexibility than either Nichols or realist
theory permits as possible. Even a casual review of international,
trade-related institutions reveals a number of international
governance mechanisms in which states successfully share power
with private parties. For example, the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") of the World
Bank and the International Labor Organization ("ILO") permit
private parties to participate with states in settling disputes and
making policy.72 The ICSID permits private parties, mainly
banks, to sue states and obtain binding arbitration awards that the
domestic courts of the defendant states are obligated by treaty to
enforce.73 The ICSID is a global international adjudicatory
system, not one restricted to European states or even to democra-
cies.74 The same holds true for the world wide system of
international commercial arbitration."
Additionally, the European Union provides an alternative
conception to the realist emphasis on dispute resolution and
policymaking machinery monopolized by states.7 6  Nichols
acknowledges that analogies between the EU and the WTO are
"inevitable" and even "useful,"77 but then quickly characterizes
the EU as exceptional - and therefore of no relevance to the
WTO - primarily because the EU is composed of democratic
states sharing a "commonality of values, experiences, and perspec-
tives."
78
As the Efficient Market Model reveals, there may in fact be
71 Id.
72 See Shell, supra note 6, at 886-90.
71 See id. at 889-90.
74 See id.
71 See id. at 888-89.
76 See id. at 917-19.
' Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 322.
78 See id.
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significant shared values regarding the promotion of free trade
underlying the WTO, but even assuming that no such common
values exist today, Nichols misconceives my point regarding the
EU. My point is to suggest the EU as a possible source of
inspiration for what the WTO can become given continued
integration of the global economy, not to describe what the WTO
is today.7 9 In order to create the conditions necessary for a
Trade Stakeholders Model to take root, the WTO must have a
chance to evolve over a period of years - or perhaps even decades
- in the face of continued global economic integration. Simply
put, the WTO is today where the EU was forty years ago: a
nascent collective of trading partners attempting to frame the
conditions of rule-oriented economic integration.
My thesis is that domestic and transnational forces unleashed
by global trade and cooperation will shift the ground underneath
the WTO, advancing either the business-oriented Efficient Market
Model or the more broad-based, participatory Trade Stakeholders
Model. The history of the EU gives me hope that the outcome
of this dynamic process will have some of the attributes of a
Trade Stakeholders Model system - as the EU has today.80
Nichols offers an alternative, rather static vision of the dynamics
of trade governance in which states - at least at the global level
- continue to dominate and control global economic forces. His
proposals for WTO reform seek to lead the WTO toward a return
to the traditional realist assumptions that appear to have worked
successfully for the GATT."
71 See Shell, supra note 6, at 838 (noting that "ultimately" all trade
stakeholders should have "places at the table," but that '[slubstantial institution-
al reforms will be needed... before the Trade Stakeholders Model can be used
as a blueprint for future jurisprudential developments and systemic reforms
within the WTO").
so See Shell, supra note 6, at 917-19 (describing aspects of the EU institution-
al arrangements that embody Trade Stakeholder Model values, including
standing for private parties in the ECJ and the transnational election of
representatives to the European Parliament).
S The disagreement between Nichols and me on this point is, of course,
one of fact and cannot be readily resolved without a crystal ball. Nichols'
realist perspective certainly has power in today's world and helps to explain
such things as the U.S. decision to bypass the WTO dispute resolution, instead
using section 301 in its recent dispute with Japan over U.S. auto parts sales in
Japan. See G. Richard Shell, Kantor's "Sue A"e Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1995, at A27 (stating that "[t]he United States is teaching the world to
litigate American style in the new W.T.O. legal system" by thinking of trade
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Differences of theoretical inclination aside, let us look for a
moment at Nichols' three substantive objections regarding NGO
participation in the WTO. First, he asserts that NGO participa-
tion in the WTO undermines the authority of states to negotiate
trade policies.8 2 The logic of Nichols' argument runs as follows:
some domestic NGOs might oppose their government's position
on a trade issue; such opposition would create an unseemly
"spectacle" as "irreconcilable dissonance" surfaced between the
state and the subject NGOs; "uncertainty about a country's true
position" would then ensue; and finally other states would become
reluctant "to negotiate with that country."3
This argument gives trade bureaucrats too little credit. Is it
really so difficult to discern the differences among positions taken
by the United States government, the World Wildlife Federation,
or domestic trade associations? In the United States, the EU, and
even the United Nations, issues routinely pit governments against
governments and governments against interest groups.14 In these
situations, parties do not become unduly confused about which
group, government, or entity stands on which side of the issue.
Although the WTO has more members than any regional political
or constitutional union, trade bureaucrats are professionals who
live in an information age in which it is possible to stay informed
in terms of "contracts" and "damages" and believing that the United States can
gain more than it loses by breaching the WTO strictures); Silverman, supra
note 26, at 263-93 (describing the events surrounding the U.S.-Japanese auto and
auto parts dispute and suggesting how the WTO might resove the conflict
between multilateral and unilateral dispute resolution). It is also worth
recalling that I identified the realism-based Regime Management Model as the
best overall description of the way the WTO is presently structured. Thus, our
disagreement does not center on the way things are but rather on the way they
will and ought to be.
2 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 317-18.
83 Id.
8" For example, in a case now before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S.
government is suing the state of Virginia over Virginia's sponsorship of a public
college that excludes women, the Virginia Military Institute. See United States
v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied 52 F.3d 90, cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 281 (1995). A variety of interest groups have weighed in on one side
or the other of this case. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1229-30 (list-
ing the numerous private associations who have attempted to influence the
outcome of this case as friends of the court). Nobody has expressed confusion
over whether - nor implicitly suggested that - the National Organization for
Women speaks for the Justice Department or the VMI Alumni Association
speaks for the state of Virginia.
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about political positions and interest group politics in various
trading states. Such information makes it possible to discern
where a state's position on a trade issue ends and an interest
group's position begins. I see no substantial disincentive to trade
negotiations given this greater transparency.
Second, Nichols thinks the WTO is not up to the task of
fairly choosing which NGOs should - or should not - be
heard. 5 Once again, Nichols relies on an assumption of bureau-
cratic incompetence to support his view that states should have a
monopoly on trade policy and adjudication. Even if increased
participation is desirable, he argues, no nonstate voices should be
heard because WTO member states could never equitably decide
which subset of nonstate voices should be heard in any given
matter.
8 6
This argument defies both domestic and international experi-
ence. The U.S. Supreme Court17 and the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ")"8 have developed rules to decide standing ques-
tions. These rules may not be perfect, but they are sufficiently
fair to satisfy most participants that decisions of standing are not
sheer acts of arbitrary political judgment. Similarly, the United
Nations has evolved an elaborate set of criteria for qualifying
international NGOs to participate in U.N. business. 9 Perhaps
the U.N. standards could be used for international NGO
participation in the WTO 0 Finally, this entire issue could be
left to the community of NGOs themselves with some form of
85 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 318-19.
86 See id.
s Before the United States Supreme Court, the normal rules of standing
apply in cases where litigants advance their own interests, but special rules o
standing apply when a litigant represents another's interests "to ensure that the
controversy is indeed genuine and the interests of the individuals alleged to be
represented are indeed protected." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 145-54 (2d ed. 1988).
Is See K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 57-65, 122 (1984) (stating which persons may appear before the
court and the requirements that must be met in order to participate in a
proceeding).
89 See Charnovitz & Wickham, supra note 15, at 111-16 (describing the
U.N. Charter provision that contemplates relationships with NGOs).
90 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 337-40 (stating that the GATT
Secretariat prepared a report for the first ITO conference which contained
proposed procedures for NGO involvement in the ITO, the predecessor to the
GAT).
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representative standing as the goal.91
Third, and most damaging, Nichols fears that NGO participa-
tion will weaken the ability of the WTO to pursue the goal of
free trade.9 2 Nichols believes such participation will bring trade
issues into the "sunshine" of global publicity, amplify the voice of
protectionist groups opposed to trade liberalization, and eliminate
the old GATT/new WTO "buffer" that insulates international
trade bureaucrats from domestic protectionist forces.93 This is
a serious concern - one that goes to the heart of my critique of
the WTO.
NGO participation by nonstate parties will certainly bring
publicity to global trade issues, and this sunshine will affect the
way trade bureaucrats make decisions. But domestic protectionist
groups will not be the sole, or even the main, beneficiaries of
these reforms. Rather, domestic business interests that favor free
trade, as well as international NGOs who champion global issues
like the environment, labor and human rights, consumer protec-
tion, and product safety standardization, perhaps supported by
domestic counterparts, will be the big "winners" from my
suggested reforms.
Protectionism is a battle most likely won at the domestic level,
where protectionists' pain is concentrated, and lost at the transna-
tional level, where any given protectionist agenda balances against
the much greater gains realized by those who benefit from trade.
Thus, even as domestic politics requires certain exemptions or
enhanced protection for politically vocal, import-competing
industries, trade treaties tend to liberalize trade on a net basis
rather than restrict it. 94  Trade adjudication then works
incrementally to further implement trade liberalization. It is no
coincidence that the case in which the ECJ first recognized the
standing of a private party to bring a complaint against a govern-
ment involved a Dutch importer seeking to overturn his own
91 See id. at 356.
9 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 319-21.
9' See id.
94 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free-Trade
Agreements, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 680-81 (1995) (modeling the politics of
free trade agreements in a way that demonstrate the need to provide both some
measure of protection to or exemption for import-competing industries in order
for trade deals to be politically viable).
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government's protectionist custom duties on imports95 - not a
protectionist group seeking relief from Dutch free trade policies.
The same overall trend characterized GATT adjudications.
Environmental and similar global welfare perspectives,
meanwhile, need be neither protectionist nor antiprotectionist. %
Concerns for global warming, clean air, and chemical toxicity
express independent, valid transnational values that WTO
treatymakers and many domestic governments have chosen to
minimize.' Because the general welfare of the earth's peoples
may depend on linking these values to trade policies at the
international - and not just the domestic governmental - level,
such perspectives deserve a multifaceted hearing within the WTO.
Perhaps protectionists' interests will occasionally coincide with an
environmental or consumer value, but potential coincidence is no
reason for the wholesale rejection of all environmental, labor, or
consumer voices.
It is precisely the technical "legalization" of global trade
institutions that might possibly lead to their silent "capture" by
the narrow set of business interests that are positioned to benefit
most directly from indiscriminate global economic expansion."
The Efficient Market Model seeks a global legal institution that
can remove trade issues from the "noisy" realm of domestic
politics and place those trade issues into the rarified atmosphere
of legal proceedings in Geneva, closed to all except a few states
and business parties most directly affected by the outcomes.99
The Trade Stakeholders Model envisions an alternative that
allows a broader array of private interests - not just business
parties - to have a hand in both international trade policymaking
and adjudication. Normatively, I believe that broader participa-
tion by nonstate parties, not monopolization by states, will give
the WTO the credibility it will need to make effective, legitimate
s See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming
Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.
1.
96 See Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International
Law, 30 HARv. INT'L LJ. 393, 393 n.1 (1989) (noting that global climate change
has been recognized by governments as "a common concern of mankind").
" See id. at 393 (noting that "states have generally proved unwilling to
exercise their right of 'guardianship' over the global environment").
9' See Shell, supra note 6, at 881-85.
9 See id.
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pronouncements on trade and trade-related issues.
Nichols thinks that WTO's future depends on injecting
nontrade values into the WTO while keeping the collision of
trade and nontrade trade issues as quiet as possible.10°  He
proposes two ideas to achieve this goal. First, Nichols proposes
to put nontrade experts on WTO panels.0 1 This is an attractive
idea that fits nicely into the overall structure of the Trade
Stakeholders Model and I support it. But when viewed in light of
Nichols' overall theory of WTO panel practice, his proposal will
do very little to alter the GATT status quo. I therefore fear that
putting nontrade experts on panels without letting nonstate parties
participate in panel proceedings would result in a change of
"appearance" only without a change in either the procedural or
substantive justice of WTO decisionmaking.
Nichols asserts that WTO panels "are not courts and are not
meant to be courts."10 2 He also sees the panelists in the WTO
system as carrying on the pragmatic and "consciously circumspect"
traditions of the old GATT panels.3 With nontrade experts
safely relegated to a minority role on such "circumspect" panels
- and without any nontrade experts at all on the all-important
WTO Appellate Body - nothing need change about the results
the panels will reach. Nor would such a reform do much to
broaden the base of domestic and international political support
for the WTO. To achieve broadened support and confidence, the
WTO will need to let outsiders into the dispute resolution process
so they can judge whether the nontrade perspective is being
expressed effectively and considered seriously.
Second, Nichols proposes that when the Appellate Body is
ultimately forced to grapple directly and legalistically with
collisions between trade and nontrade values, the Appellate Body
should interpret the WTO Charter to exempt from WTO
override any domestic law enacted "primarily" to codify some
"underlying societal value" other than trade.1 4  This proposal,
100 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 315 (stating that
moving trade further into public view coud "prove disastrous for free trade").
101 See id. at 328-29.
102 Id. at 326.
103 Id. at 325.
104 See Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 297, 301; Nichols,
Trade Without Values, supra note 17, at 709.
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which I previously embraced as at least within the spirit of the
Trade Stakeholders Model, 5 is likely to return the WTO to the
GATT status quo.
Exempting from WTO scrutiny a law that codifies an
underlying societal value would encourage domestic protectionist
groups to meticulously draft domestic laws favoring domestic
industries to give these laws an appearance of being "primarily"
directed at a legitimate "underlying societal value." Careful
drafting of domestic laws could easily become the old GATT
"veto" power in disguise, because there is no reliable way for a
member of the WTO Appellate Body to pierce the surface of
domestic laws and discover their "true" purpose. Nor does
Nichols offer a persuasive, principled method of analysis whereby
the Appellate Body could distinguish which societal values are
"legitimate" and which domestic laws having protectionist effects
might be deemed exempt from WTO review because they are
"primarily" directed at those "legitimate" values. In short, this
idea would give protectionism a new tool to avoid the liberal
trade regime just when the system of trading states had figured out
a way to use an international mechanism to trump these forc-
es.
l16
105 See Shell, supra note 6, at 921.
106 One way to get a taste for these interpretive difficulties is to observe the
clashes that occur when U.S. courts attempt to discern whether government
actions that have racially discriminatory effects can be overturned based on a
finding of discriminatory "intent." In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S.
100 (1981), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine if a
city had acted lawfully in agreeing, at the request of a white neighborhood, to
lace a road barrier between that neighborhood and an immediately adjoining
black neighborhood so that traffic would not flow between the two areas. The
issue was whether the city acted with discriminatory intent or for reasons
related to neighborhood safety and orderliness. After a full trial in which
various neighborhood residents and city officials gave testimony as to their
states of mind, the district court held that the city acted from a proper motive.
See id. at 108. The appeals court reviewed the same evidence and held that the
city had an improper motive. See id. at 109. The Supreme Court took at look
at the same evidence a third time and, over a dissent by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, see id. at 135, held that the city acted lawfully. See id. at 110-29. In
short, the motives of the city residents and officials were difficult to parse and
different judges drew different inferences from the evidence. Professor Nichols'
proposal to charge international jurists with judging the motives of various
national legislatures as "legitimate" or "protectionist" without any mechanism
for taking primary evidence on motive as a question of fact makes the City of
Memphis case look easy. Just like the road barriers in the City ofMemphis case,
the trade barriers of international relations have very complex origins that
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. I. Int'l Econ. L.
4. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize our differences, Nichols writes that countries
asked to choose between "obedience to the World Trade Organi-
zation and having empirically legitimate [domestic] laws" will
choose the latter."07 As a realist, Nichols is convinced that states
will thus fatally undermine the WTO. His solution is to see that
states can avoid this choice. Meanwhile, to assuage international
environmental and interest groups with nontrade agendas, he
proposes to place nontrade experts in minority positions on WTO
panels but not on the Appellate Body, which has the final word
on WTO law. Nichols is worried that the WTO's current
structure may be too rigid to withstand the political winds of
domestic politics, but he thinks that my proposals will push trade
even more into the political "spotlight," making the WTO's
situation worse.
As a foreign relations liberal, I have more confidence that the
domestic and transnational political conditions under which the
WTO operates can change and, furthermore, that the forces of
global economic integration will eventually push the WTO
toward more transparency, especially with respect to the business
interests that are directly effected by domestic trade policies. In
this altered world, the WTO must accommodate a broader set of
trade stakeholders if the it is to command sufficiently broad
support to achieve compliance with its legal decisions.
Unlike Nichols, I think that the "quiet" days of trade adjudica-
tion and policymaking are gone. His attempts to preserve trade
in a zone of secrecy will only hurt our common cause of creating
a robust system for resolving international trade disputes. Reports
on global economic integration and competition are the stuff of
everyday news,"' and trade policymaking will (and should)
cannot be parsed by simply reading the laws that create them.
107 Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 13, at 300.
108 The 1996 Republican Presidential primaries suggest that I am correct as
trade has developed into a substantial campaign issue even though Republicans
are traditionally a party favoring liberal trade. See Richard L. Berke, Candidates
Clash Over Trade Issues Heading Into Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al
(quoting Bob Dole as not realizing "that jobs and trade ... would become a big
issue in the last few days of this [primary] campaign"); David E. Sanger, A
Flare-Up of Passions Over Global Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al
(reporting that Patrick Buchanan's campaign for President has "gathered steam
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never again be the special province of the foreign policy and trade
elites. The question for today is not how to put a lid on publicity
regarding trade differences, it is how best to assure that points of
view about transnational issues such as the environment, consum-
er issues, and labor standards - issues that no single state may
have a sufficient incentive to champion consistently - are heard
in the international trade institutions that will increasingly have
the power to shape our future.
and passionate crowds with his thundering calls for economic nationalism").
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